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Résumé: Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs 
basés sur les infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces 
mécanismes sont soit monétaires (amendes, primes d'assurance), soit non 
monétaires (permis à points). Nous utilisons des données québécoises couvrant 
une période allant de 1983 à 1996 pour analyser l'efficacité incitative de ces 
mécanismes. Nous analysons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre 
de points associés aux infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés 
sont ensuite testées empiriquement. Nous comparons l'efficacité globale des 
différents mécanismes incitatifs et nous relions les résultats obtenus avec les 
propriétés de la relation entre l'effort de conduite prudente et le risque 
d'infractions. Nous concluons à la présence d'aléa moral dans les données. Par 
ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite en 1992 a réduit de 15% la 
fréquence d'infractions. 
 
Abstract: Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to 
promote safe driving. These mechanisms are both monetary (fines, insurance 
premiums) and non-monetary (point-record driving licenses). We use Quebec data 
collected between 1983 and 1996 to analyze the efficiency of these mechanisms in 
reducing the effects of asymmetric information. We derive the theoretical 
properties of the incentive mechanisms with respect to contract time and 
accumulated demerit points. These properties are then tested empirically. We 
compare the overall efficiency of the different incentive schemes and try to link 
global results with the theoretical properties of the relation between safe driving 
effort and traffic violation risk. We do not reject the presence of moral hazard in 
the data. Moreover, the experience rating premium introduced in 1992 did reduce 
the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. 
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1 Introduction
Since the seventies fatality rates due to road-traﬃc accidents have decreased
steadily in developed countries, although risk exposure increased at the same
time (see OECD, 2005). This situation stands in sharp contrast to that in less
developed regions, especially emerging economies. For example, the road fatality
rate decreased by forty percent in France during the last ten years, whereas it
was multiplied by five in Vietnam.1 As of 2004, the average number of fatalities
per 100,000 persons was equal to 20 at the world level. This number is always
lower for OECD countries and higher for emerging countries.2 The implied
social cost is very heavy, even in developed countries (Doyle, 2005). By 2020,
road-traﬃc accidents should become the third cause of the disability-adjusted
life years lost from disease or injury worldwide (Murray and Lopez, 1997). The
corresponding rank was equal to nine in 1990.
The discrepancy between economic regions with respect to the social costs of
road-traﬃc accidents can be explained by many factors. For instance, the "Had-
don matrix" (Haddon, 1968) provides a multifactorial approach to road safety,
in which human, vehicle, and environment factors are crossed with three phases
(before, during and after the accident). All the factors clearly play in favor
of the most developed countries. A major reason for the improvement of the
situation in the OECD has been the development of incentives for safe driving.
Experience rating schemes used by the insurance industry have incentive proper-
ties (see Boyer and Dionne, 1989; Abbring et al, 2003). They are supplemented
by point-record driving licenses based on traﬃc violations. In many countries,
each convicted traﬃc oﬀense is filed with a specific number of demerit points.
When the accumulated number of points exceeds a given threshold, the driving
license is suspended. Redemption clauses are added so that this penalty can
be avoided in the long run.3 Bourgeon and Picard (2007) investigate the most
desirable features of point-record licenses in terms of road safety incentives and
discuss how they can be combined with fines to design an optimal system that
internalizes the social cost of road accidents. They do not take into account
insurance pricing based on traﬃc violations.
A point-record driving license was implemented in Quebec in 1978, together with
a no-fault insurance regime for bodily injuries which replaced a tort system. The
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North American continent preceded Europe in the design of such systems. Point-
record driving licenses were introduced in 1947 in the USA. By comparison,
they were introduced in Germany, France, and Spain in 1974, 1992 and 2005,
respectively.
Increases in premiums are often triggered by claims at fault in the motor insur-
ance sector. No-fault environments are however common in the North American
continent, and traﬃc violations are in consequence events likely to be used in
experience rating schemes.4 In Quebec, the Société de l’Assurance Automobile
du Quebec (referred to as SAAQ in what follows) is a public monopoly which
provides coverage for bodily injury. The SAAQ is also in charge of accident
prevention and control, which includes the management of driving licenses. Be-
fore 1992, the rating structure for bodily injury insurance was completely flat.
The public authorities in Quebec decided to implement an experience rating
scheme based on accumulated demerit points, a reform applied from December
1, 1992 onwards. This mechanism was added to other incentives, i.e. fines, the
point-record driving license in force since 1978, and the private sector insurance
pricing scheme for property damage.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the incentive properties of both point-
record driving license and insurance pricing based on traﬃc violations. Using
data from 1983 to 1996, we want to compare theoretical results to empirical
findings obtained from SAAQ policies. Section 2 reviews the recent literature
on asymmetric information and road safety. Section 3 presents the data base
and the first empirical results related to the introduction of the new pricing
policy implemented in 1992. The point-record mechanisms (driving license and
insurance pricing) are described in Section 4 and their incentive properties are
investigated in a continuous-time model of optimal behavior that extends the
previous literature significantly. These results are then confronted with empirical
findings. Identifiability issues created by unobserved heterogeneity are addressed
in Section 5. Section 6 presents empirical evidence on the incentive properties of
the two point-record mechanisms. In the spirit of Abbring et al (2003), we pro-
pose a means of disentangling unobserved heterogeneity from incentive eﬀects
in a duration model. It involves including an actuarial predictor as an oﬀset
variable in the hazard function. The incentives created by the threat of driving
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license suspension are found to increase with accumulated demerit points and
to decrease with the seniority of the last traﬃc oﬀense, if any. These findings
confirm the theoretical analysis. Additionally, we find that driving license sus-
pension spells reduce accident and traﬃc oﬀense risks. A possible explanation
is that the perceived driving utility of drivers increases after a driving license
suspension spell.
The experience rating system implemented in 1992 substantially reduced traﬃc
violations among all drivers, whatever their incentive level. Lastly, we compare
the overall eﬃciency of the diﬀerent incentive schemes, and try to link global
results to theoretical properties of the relation between safe driving eﬀort and
traﬃc violation risk. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7 and technicalities are
relegated to an appendix.
2 Literature review on asymmetric information
and road safety
Studies on incentive mechanisms for road safety have been discussed in the
economic literature for many years (Peltzman, 1975; Landes, 1982; Graham and
Garber, 1984; Boyer and Dionne, 1987; Blomquist, 1988). Many mechanisms
have been proposed. Those most relevant to our purpose are fines, point-record
driving licences, and insurance experience rating. In the last mentioned case, the
individual driving history is summarized by past accidents or by point-records
based on traﬃc oﬀenses.
In the presence of asymmetric information, insurers use partial insurance or ex-
perience rating to improve resource allocation. Both schemes have been proved
to be eﬃcient for handling moral hazard and adverse selection (see Shavell,
1979; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, for partial insurance, and Chiappori et al,
1994; Dionne and Lasserre, 1985, for experience rating). Diﬀerent empirical
tests have been proposed to measure the eﬃciency of such mechanisms for road
safety (Sloan et al, 1995; Boyer and Dionne, 1989) or to measure the presence of
residual asymmetric information problems in insurers’ portfolios (Chiappori and
Salanié, 2000; Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse, 2001). More recently, Abbring,
Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) designed a new test based on the dynamics of in-
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surance contracts to detect the presence of residual moral hazard. Their model
makes it possible to separate the moral hazard eﬀect on accidents from unob-
served heterogeneity. They found no evidence of moral hazard in the French car
insurance market5. Their approach consists in analysing the behavior of policy-
holders in the studied insurance setting and contrasting this behavior with that
predicted by theoretical models under moral hazard and adverse selection. Both
problems can be identified from a detailed analysis of the data. Accidents change
the schedule of future premiums and incentives for road safety. Individuals that
accumulate accidents are charged higher premiums and, under moral hazard,
should improve their driving behavior and reduce their risk to retrieve their
original premium. So a negative correlation should be observed between past
accidents and future accidents under moral hazard. The empirical test is not
so simple, however, since it involves the distinction between pure heterogeneity
and state dependence.
Insurance pricing may not be suﬃcient as a tool for designing an optimal road
safety policy since it may not create the appropriate incentives for reckless drivers
(Sloan et al, 1995). Bourgeon and Picard (2007) show how point-record driving
licence suspensions provide incentives for road safety among normal drivers in
presence of failures in the judicial system or in the insurance market to provide
optimal incentives. Point-record driving licences also allow the government to
incapacitate reckless drivers. Fines for traﬃc violations (as insurance pricing)
may be ineﬀective for reckless drivers when their amounts are bounded above,
either because some drivers would not be able to pay them or for some equity
reasons (see also Shavell, 1987). However, fines (as insurance pricing) do rein-
force the eﬃciency of the point record mechanism by providing more incentives
to normal drivers. It must be emphasized that, in their model with only two
levels of prevention, the optimal fine must be fixed at its maximal level and
must be neither progressive nor regressive. Finally they discuss the optimality
of redeeming mechanisms as a screening device.
Public intervention can also be justified when there is a significant diﬀerence
between the private and the social cost of human lives (Viscusi, 1993). Finally,
drivers may be poorly informed on their own accident or infraction probabilities
or may misunderstand some features of the incentive environment.
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The economic environment we shall study in the next sections contains many
common characteristics discussed above as well as diﬀerences that will be im-
portant for the analysis and interpretation of the results with respect to the
presence of moral hazard in the data. Regarding Abbring et al (2003), the in-
surance pricing scheme is not the major incentive scheme in this study but is
a complementary tool to the point-record driving licence. The commitment en-
vironment is about the same as well as the wealth eﬀect which is rather weak.
However, the pricing scheme of the Quebec public automobile insurance is not
strictly increasing and convex with respect to past demerit points but is increas-
ing by steps.
With respect to the theoretical contribution of Bourgeon and Picard (2007), we
shall test the prediction that point-record driving licence is eﬃcient for road
safety under moral hazard. We shall also study the complementary aspect of
fines by considering some particularities of the public insurance pricing based
on past convictions as a progressive fine based on traﬃc oﬀenses history. It can
also be interpreted as a malus scheme without the bonus counterpart.
3 Presentation of the data base and prelimi-
nary empirical results
Our data base represents roughly one percent of the SAAQ portfolio. The panel
covers the period from January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1996. A first sample of
40,000 license holders was selected at random at the beginning of 1983. Then
about 300 young drivers were added each following year.6 Leaving the motor
insurance market is the only cause of attrition from the data base. The attrition
rate per year is close to 1.5%, which is very low as compared to the private
sector.7 This attrition result is obviously explained by the monopolistic position
of the SAAQ. Moreover, endogenous attrition is not very high, and can be
estimated from a bivariate probit model on traﬃc oﬀenses and departures from
the sample. A score test for the nullity of the correlation coeﬃcient between
the two equations8 was performed with the regression components set used in
Section 6. The null hypothesis was not rejected at a five percent significance
level.
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For each driver, we have the personal characteristics available on the driving
license for the current period. They are used as regression components in the
empirical study. Several types of events are recorded in the data base; they are
listed below with related variables in addition to the date.
• Accidents which have led to a police report. Only those with bodily injury
are compensated by the SAAQ.
• Convicted violations of the Road Safety Code, together with the number
of demerit points which are used in the point-record mechanisms. The
number of demerit points is related to the severity of the traﬃc violation.
Their distribution is given in Section 4.4.
• Driving license suspensions, which are spells rather than events.
• The premium payments which are related to accumulated demerit points
since the 1992 reform. They are made every two years on the policyholder’s
birthday.
The yearly frequencies of accidents with bodily injuries, accidents of all types
(not including jointly-agreed reports to private insurers) and traﬃc violations
are equal to, respectively, 1.4%, 6.7% and 16.9% on average between 1985 and
1996. Figure 1 represents the relative frequencies derived from a one year moving
average.9
Insert Figure 1 about here
There is an overall decline in the frequency of accidents, whereas the frequency
of traﬃc violations remains more stationary. This may seem surprising, but it is
explained by the evolution of the traﬃc control environment. For instance, the
number of traﬃc control devices such as radars increased during the eighties and
nineties. An increase in the rate of traﬃc oﬀenses recorded by devices or po-
lice oﬃcers among those committed explains this relationship. Figure 1 shows
evidence of several periods where the frequency of traﬃc violations increased
along with opposite variations in the frequencies of accidents. An increase in
the intensity of traﬃc control during these periods may well explain such obser-
vations.
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A traﬃc violation committed by a driver must be selected twice in order to be
filed with demerit points. First, it must be recorded by a control device or a
police oﬃcer. We already mentioned that the related selection rate increased
in the past. Second, the recorded traﬃc violation must be convicted. Now the
attribution of demerit points is somewhat discretionary. After the 1992 reform
for instance, people are being forced to pay more in premiums given demerit
points, and we might expect policemen to be more hesitant to hand them out,
and to give warnings instead.10 We think however that the second selection rate
is less likely to vary with time than the first one.
A downturn is also observed in Figure 1 for the frequency of traﬃc violations
just before the date (December 1, 1992) of the reform which introduced the ex-
perience rating structure based on demerit points. Notice that the reform was
announced four months before its enforcement, which may explain this lag.11
On average, the annual frequency of traﬃc violations was equal to 17.6% before
the reform and 15.4% afterwards, which corresponds to a 12.5% decrease. The
1992 reform can be interpreted as a laboratory experiment to test whether an
exogenous change in the use of memory reduces traﬃc violations. But the lower
rate of traﬃc violations following the 1992 Quebec reform may be due to the
change of other factors that may influence the driver behavior. Identifying the
influence of these factors necessitates a control group that is not aﬀected by the
policy change. Unfortunately, we do not have access to such a control group
since the insurer is a monopoly. In Section 6.2, we will link the average decrease
in traﬃc violation frequency before and after the 1992 reform to the overall eﬃ-
ciency of the diﬀerent incentive schemes (i.e. fines, point-record driving license
and insurance premium).
As monetary and non monetary incentives to safe driving are based on demerit
points, the optimal behavior models designed in Section 4 link safe driving eﬀort
and traﬃc violation risk. However the social cost of road traﬃc is caused by
accidents. To reconcile these two approaches, let us mention two results. First,
demerit points are good predictors of accidents. This is well documented in
the literature and is confirmed on our data in Section 6.1. Second, the global
stationarity of convicted traﬃc violations frequency observed in Figure 1 coexists
with a probable decrease in the frequency of committed traﬃc violations (see
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the aforementioned developments on selection rates). Lowering traﬃc violation
risk through point-record mechanisms should also lower accident risk and the
related social cost.
Finally, we observe in Figure 1 that accidents with bodily injuries evolve in much
the same way as all those recorded in the SAAQ file. We include accidents of
all types in the empirical analysis in order to obtain more stable results.12
4 Incentive eﬀects of point-record mechanisms
4.1 Point-record mechanisms in Quebec
In this section, we describe Quebec’s point-record mechanisms which are derived
from traﬃc violations, both monetary (insurance premiums) and non-monetary
(point-record driving license). Comparisons are given with respect to mecha-
nisms used by other countries. Then we investigate their incentive properties.
In many countries nowadays driving license suspensions are based on demerit
points. In Quebec, demerit points are assigned to convictions for traﬃc oﬀenses
and their numbers depend on the traﬃc violation severity. If the accumulated
number of demerit points reaches or exceeds a given threshold, the driving license
is suspended. Before January 1990 this threshold was equal to twelve in Quebec
and has been equal to fifteen since then.
In order to mitigate the social cost of driving license suspension, redeeming
systems exist in most real-world point-record driving licenses. In Quebec, the
demerit points related to a given driving oﬀense are redeemed after two years.
Hence, driving license suspensions will depend on the demerit points recorded
during the last two years. The French system is similar, with a duration of
three years and a twelve point threshold. New York State follows the same logic
as Quebec and France (with an eighteen month seniority for the redemption of
oﬀenses and an eleven point threshold).
The average number of demerit points per convicted oﬀense is equal to 2.4 in
Quebec (a distribution is given in Section 4.4). Hence a license suspension is
very unlikely with the average frequency of traﬃc violations. But heterogeneity
of risks is high and a point-record driving licence is also an incapacitating device
of risky and reckless drivers through the licence suspensions.
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Another redeeming system consists in cancelling all the demerit points after a
given period of violation-free driving. This mechanism was recently implemented
in Spain, with a two year period.13 Utah has a point-record driving license
similar to the Spanish one.
The experience rating structure introduced by the SAAQ in December 1, 1992
links each premium paid every two years to the demerit points accumulated over
the previous two years. The rating structure is given in Section 4.4. Once the
premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with a fresh zero point record. Thus
the length of the record relevant to the derivation of optimal behavior never
exceeds two years.
4.2 Basic model for a point-record driving license with-
out redemption
Bourgeon and Picard (2007) analyze the incentive eﬀects of point-record driving
licenses for normal drivers. Their model uses a binary eﬀort variable. They
also examine features such as redeeming mechanisms or probationary licenses.
We extend their approach with a continuous eﬀort level. Hence the eﬃciency of
eﬀort may also be a continuous function of contract time, a desirable property
for empirical validation. The basic model described in this section shows that
the careful driving eﬀort exerted by a rational policyholder increases with the
number of accumulated demerit points under fairly general conditions.
We suppose that the driving license is revoked when the driver reaches a total
of N demerit points. For the sake of simplicity, each convicted traﬃc violation
is linked to one supplementary demerit point in this section.14 A driver with a
suspended driving license is reinstated after a period D with a fresh zero-point
record like that of a beginner.15 The duration D may be fixed or random in the
model. In Quebec, a licence suspension is of random length because drivers must
pass a new exam after a given period before recovering their driving license. A
rational driver maximizes an expected lifetime utility expressed in $ and derived
from:
• An instantaneous driving utility, du.
• A time-dependent disutility of eﬀort, which we denote as e(t).16 This eﬀort
9
level is linked to an instantaneous traﬃc violation frequency risk, denoted
as λ(e(t)). The hazard function λ is assumed to be a positive, decreasing
and strictly convex function of the eﬀort level. The utility flow du − e(t)
is continuously discounted at an interest rate denoted by r.
In this section, we suppose that there is no redeeming mechanism. In that case,
the lifetime expected utility (we assume an infinite horizon) depends only on
the number of accumulated demerit points, which we denote as n. The Bellman
equation on the expected utility
un = max
e≥0
(du−e)dt+(exp(−rdt)× [((1− λ(e)dt)× un) + (λ(e)dt× un+1) + o(dt)])
leads to
un =
du
r
− λ∗(un − un+1)
r
, (0 ≤ n < N), (1)
where
λ∗(∆u) =
def
min
e≥0
e+ [λ(e)×∆u] . (2)
In equation (2), ∆u is the lifetime utility loss between the current state and
the one reached after a supplementary traﬃc oﬀense, and e+ [λ(e)×∆u] is the
disutility flow of both eﬀort and the corresponding lifetime utility loss.
The function λ∗ is the dual of the hazard function λ (see Rockafellar, 1996, and
Appendix A.1 for more details and for proofs of the results that follow). All
the un are lower than umax = du/r, which is the private lifetime driving utility
without the point-record driving license. Equation (1) means that λ∗(un −
un+1)/r is the minimal private utility cost of the point-record mechanism for a
driver with n demerit points.
If the private disutility of driving license suspension is only the loss of driving
utility during a period D, we have that
uN = βu0, β = E[exp(−rD)]. (3)
We consider that uN is the lifetime expected utility just after the suspension of
the driving license. The utilities are then derived from the recurrence equations
(1) and (3).
Optimal eﬀort depends on the variation of lifetime utility as it minimizes the
function defined in equation (2). Hence optimal eﬀort depends on the number
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of accumulated demerit points, but not on time in this setting. We denote the
optimal eﬀort associated with n demerit points as en. We have that
en > 0⇔ un − un+1 >
−1
λ
0
(0)
. (4)
Besides, it is shown in Appendix A.1 that en increases with n for any given value
of N .
Fines represent another monetary incentive scheme applied in Quebec during
the whole period investigated in this study. Let us denote fa as the average fine
for a traﬃc violation conviction. Since fines and premiums are low in comparison
to average wealth, we leave out risk aversion. With fines, equation (4) becomes
en > 0⇔ un − un+1 + fa >
−1
λ
0
(0)
. (5)
Fines by themselves do not deter drivers from using their cars if du > λ∗(fa). If
fines are combined with the preceding point-record driving license, the optimal
eﬀort still increases with n for a given value of the average fine. The incentives
are eﬀective for every value of n if fa > −1/λ0(0). The optimal eﬀort also
increases with the average fine for any given values of n and N (see Appendix
A.1, Figures 4a, 4b). This result will be used in the interpretation of the incentive
eﬀects observed for the 1992 reform.
4.3 Models for point-record driving licenses with redemp-
tion
In Quebec, each traﬃc violation is redeemed at the end of a two year period.
Integrating this feature to the optimal behavior model is diﬃcult, as all the
seniorities of non-redeemed driving oﬀenses must be included as state variables
in the dynamic programming equations. Another redeeming system consists in
cancelling all the demerit points after violation-free driving of a given duration,
say T . Such mechanisms are also enforced in the real world (see Section 4.1).
An optimal behavior model is easier to design in this framework since only the
seniority of the last convicted driving oﬀense must be added to the number of
demerit points accumulated as a state variable. Later on, we will denote the
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latter redeeming mechanisms as of Type I, and the Quebec-like systems as of
Type II.
The model of the preceding section can be extended to a Type I redeeming
system (see Appendix A.2). The conclusions are the following.
• For every given number of demerit points, optimal eﬀort increases con-
tinuously with time. If optimal eﬀort is greater than zero, it is strictly
increasing.
• When all the demerit points are redeemed (i.e. after a violation-free driving
record of duration T ), the eﬀort collapses to the minimum level.
• Eﬀort variation after a convicted driving oﬀense may be positive or neg-
ative. If the last traﬃc violation immediately follows another one, the
variation is positive, but decreases with the duration between the two last
oﬀenses. A drop in the eﬀort level is expected if the duration is large
enough.
The time-eﬀect of point-record driving licenses on optimal driving behavior is
very diﬀerent with a Type II redeeming system like the one in Quebec. We do
not have rigorous proofs to provide in that intricate framework, but we use the
preceding results to guess the main qualitative properties of Type II redeeming
mechanisms.
For both types, lifetime utility is expected to increase with time for a given
number of demerit points accumulated. However the link between utility and
eﬀort is diﬀerent according to the type. Optimal eﬀort depends on the diﬀerence
between the present utility and a substitute utility (i.e. that reached after an
additional traﬃc violation). With a Type I mechanism, the substitute utility
only depends on the number of demerit points accumulated as the time variable is
reset to zero after a traﬃc violation. Hence we obtain an increasing link between
time and eﬀort. With a Type II redeeming system, all the seniorities of past
traﬃc violations are kept as state variables after an additional traﬃc violation,
and the substitute utility increases with time as the present utility. Time should
have more value for worse situations, hence the substitute utility should increase
faster than the present utility. Thus optimal eﬀort should decrease with time.
12
Besides, we prove in Appendix A.2 that optimal eﬀort is continuous before and
after a redemption, a property which does not hold for a type I mechanism. This
property will be tested empirically in Section 6.1. Optimal eﬀort is then expected
to increase at each traﬃc violation in order to compensate the decreasing link
between time and eﬀort. On the whole, the incentive properties of a Type II
system are closer to those of a mechanism without redemption than to those of
a Type I system.
4.4 Incentive eﬀects of premiums indexed on demerit
points: The example of Quebec
Table 1 presents the rating structure which was enforced for each driving license
on the first contract birthday following December 1, 1992. The premium paid
every two years after this date depends on the accumulated demerit points in
the last two years. It does not represent the total premium for bodily injury
insurance but the additional premium related to demerit points.
Insert Table 1 about here
In this section, the incentive properties of this rating structure are analysed
separately from the point-record driving license. An important input is the
distribution of demerit points for a given driving oﬀense, which we left out in
the preceding sections. Denoting fj as the proportion of traﬃc violations with
j demerit points, we have the following values
f1 = 4.71%; f2 = 52.32%; f3 = 38.34%; f4 = 2.83%; f5 = 1.80%. (6)
Note that f5 actually refers to oﬀenses with five points and more. From Table 1,
we see that the premium is a step function of the accumulated demerit points.
Because of the local non convexity of the premium, the incentives may not always
increase with the number of demerit points accumulated. Let us consider for
instance a policyholder just before her contract birthday. The incentive level
will be stronger with two accumulated demerit points than with four. With four
points, it is indeed less than likely that the next traﬃc oﬀense will trigger an
increase in premium. The corresponding probability is 2.83 + 1.80 = 4.63%,
if we assume that the distribution of the fj is independent of the accumulated
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demerit points. The incentives to safe driving are stronger at a two point level
because the probability of climbing a step in the rating structure after a traﬃc
oﬀense is close to one. The aforementioned result stands in contrast to the one
obtained by Abbring et al (2003) for the French "bonus-malus" scheme, which
has an exponential structure.
Let us design an optimal behavior model based on this rating structure. Once the
premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with a fresh zero point record. Hence
the optimal control model can be designed with the next contract birthday as
the horizon.17
We denote the premium paid for a n point record as πn. We discard here the
point-record driving license and its incentive implications. As a consequence,
the driving utility is no longer a parameter, as there is no licence deprivation.
On the other hand, we retain fines in the incentives to safe driving. We denote
vn(t) as the optimal expected disutility until the next contract birthday, where
t is the seniority of the last birthday and n is the number of demerit points
accumulated since that date. We have the terminal conditions
vn(T ) = πn, ∀n = 0, . . . , N.
The values of n greater than N (the threshold that triggers license suspension)
are absorbed by N in what follows. With the notations of Section 4.2, the
Bellman equation is the following
v
0
n(t) = rvn(t)− λ∗
¡
fa+∆vn(t)
¢
, (0 ≤ n ≤ N), (7)
with
∆vn(t) =
⎛
⎝ X
j / fj>0
fj vmin(n+j,N)(t)
⎞
⎠− vn(t).
The expected variation of the optimal disutility after a traﬃc oﬀense is denoted
as∆vn(t). It is added to the average fine in the argument of λ∗, which determines
the optimal eﬀort level. Figure 2 provides examples of functions ∆vn with the
following assumptions:
r = 0.1; λ(e) = λ(0)× exp(−αe), λ(0) = 0.22, (8)
−1/λ0(0) = $100⇔ α = 1/22.
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Insert Figure 2 about here
In equation (8), the parameter −1/λ0(0) is the threshold on the argument of
λ∗ beyond which the incentives are eﬀective (see equation (4) in the context
of point-record driving licences). We retained a value lower than the average
fine of $130 in Quebec, so that the incentives are eﬀective at every level. The
(∆vn)n=0,2,4 functions in Figure 2 are plotted with respect to t. A global average
∆v(t) =
Pn=N−1
n=0 pn (t)∆vn(t) is also plotted, where pn (t) is the probability
that a driver with the risk level λ(0) and the behavioral parameter α given in
equation (8) obtains n demerit points at date t. The average traﬃc violation
frequency including optimal eﬀort is equal to 0.155, which is close to the average
value given after the reform in Section 3.
From Figure 2, we observe that:
• Most of the functions ∆vn decrease with contract-time, which entails the
same property for optimal eﬀort. The average does increase however be-
cause the demerit point distribution shifts with time towards higher values.
• Some functions ∆vn can also increase with contract-time, which is the case
for n = 2 in this example.
• Figure 2 also shows that the incentives with two points are stronger than
with four points whatever the seniority of the last contract birthday. Hence
eﬀort is not always an increasing function of the number of demerit points
accumulated, a result which was already mentioned for contracts close to
their next birthday.
• Lastly, note that ∆v4 ≥ ∆v0, which if explained by a global convexity of
the premium schedule. Indeed, the increases in premium are equal to $50
at the first step and to $74 at the second step (see Table 1).
The overall average of ∆vn(t) with respect to t and n is close to $12 in this
example. This value depends on the individual parameters r and ∆u. However
this is not the case for the terminal values ∆vn(T ), and Figure 2 shows that
the average of ∆vn(t) with respect to n does not vary much with time. The
values ∆vn(t) are added to the average value of fines in the argument of λ∗,
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which determines the incentive level. In Section 6.2, this nine percent increase
on average with respect to $130 will be compared with the variation of traﬃc
violation frequency before and after the reform.
Solving a holistic incentive model (i.e. one which includes fines, premium and
the point-record driving license) is beyond the scope of this paper. The cor-
responding Bellman equation is given in Appendix A.4. To summarize, the
optimal eﬀort levels related to fines, point-record driving license and experience
rated premium analysed separately are constant, increasing on average and non
monotonic functions of the accumulated demerit points. We shall test these
relationships in the following sections.
5 Description and indentification issues on count
data in insurance
Frequency risk models in insurance are addressed at length by the actuarial
literature. Actuarial models use mixtures of Poisson models to describe the
dynamics of the data. Their main limitation is that identification issues are not
taken into account of, since the observed dynamics are supposed to be created
only by the revelation of unobserved heterogeneity. If random eﬀects are time-
independent, the predictor which summarizes the individual history (the "bonus-
malus" coeﬃcient) decreases with risk exposure (bonus) and increases with the
number of events (malus). Consider for instance a mixture of Poisson processes
with a hazard function λi for policyholder i. The multiplicative random eﬀect εi
verifies E(εi) = 1; V (εi) = σ2. Actuarial predictors are based on expectations
of the type E(εi|Ni,t), where Ni,t is the number of insurance claims made by
policyholder i between 0 and t. The standard formula for the "bonus-malus"
coeﬃcient is
E(εi|Ni,t) = 1 + (σ
2 ×Ni,t)
1 + (σ2 × Λi,t) , Λi,t = E(Ni,t) =
Z t
0
λi(s)ds. (9)
This formula reflects the continuous time-eﬀect of the revelation of unobserved
heterogeneity on one hand. On the other hand, there is a jump of the predictor
at each event occurrence. It is valid if εi follows a Gamma distribution (Dionne,
Vanasse, 1989), or in a semiparametric setting, with a linearity constraint on
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the shape of the predictor. This is known as the "linear credibility" approach
(Bühlmann, 1967). The hazard function which integrates experience rating is
then equal to λi(t) × E(εi|Ni,t). If the time-independence assumption of the
random eﬀects is relaxed, the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of a stationary distri-
bution usually decrease with the lag. This means that the predictive ability of
events decreases with their seniority (see Pinquet et al, 2001). The continuous
time-eﬀect of risk revelation is diﬀerent in this case. The "no-claim discount" is
lower for a claimless history than with the basic actuarial model, but stronger
since the last claim, if any. In this case indeed, the continuous aging of past
claims supplements the increase in risk exposure.
Disentangling incentive eﬀects from unobserved heterogeneity is an identification
issue. The basic strategy is to obtain statistics which are invariant with respect
to the mixing distribution related to hidden features in the risk distribution.
Abbring et al (2003) provide an inference strategy if the hazard function is
multiplied by a constant β after each event (accident for instance) and does not
vary with time. Assessing the existence of moral hazard amounts to estimating β
and testing for β < 1 if the marginal benefit of eﬀort increases with the number
of claims.
Time eﬀects do however exist in the point-record mechanisms in force in Quebec,
so we cannot apply this approach here. In Section 4.3, we showed that safe
driving eﬀort induced by the point-record driving license increases with the
number of demerit points and decreases with time if this number is greater
than zero. The induced duration-event eﬀects on traﬃc violation risk are at the
opposite of those created by the revelation of unobserved heterogeneity. A basic
empirical result in non-life insurance is that empirical hazard functions related
to frequency risks increase with claims and decrease with time. This justifies
the "bonus-malus" systems and means that incentive eﬀects do not outweigh
the revelation eﬀect on this type of data.18
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6 Empirical results on the incentive eﬀects of
point-record mechanisms
6.1 Point-record driving license
In this section, we analyze the data before the 1992 reform which introduced
the experience rating scheme based on demerit points. Thus the point-record
driving license interacts only with fines. Regressions are performed from January
1985 (we need a two year history to derive the accumulated demerit points)
to December 1992, date of the reform enforcement. We will try to obtain a
confirmation of the theoretical findings of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 (i.e. the eﬀort
level globally increases with the accumulated demerit points and decreases with
the seniority of non redeemed traﬃc violations, if any), and to confirm the
presence of moral hazard in the data.
The whole history of traﬃc violations is useful in assessing the revelation of
unobserved heterogeneity, whereas the last two years are enough to determine the
incentive level. The hazard functions of convicted traﬃc oﬀenses and accidents
are estimated with a proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972). We retained the
following specification
λji (t) = exp(xi(t)βj)×gj(cdpi(t))×kj(nspsi(t))×BM ji (m(t))×hSi(t)j (ci(t)). (10)
In equation (10), λji (t) is the hazard function of type j (j = 1 : traﬃc violation
or j = 2 : accident) for driver i at calendar time t. Regression components
which do not refer to the individual driver record are denoted by the line-vector
xi(t). We retained the gender, driving license class, place of residence, age of
the driver and calendar eﬀects related to years and months.19 The number of
demerit points accumulated in the last two years is denoted as cdpi(t), and a
decreasing shape is expected for g1 from the theoretical model of Sections 4.2
and 4.3. The variable nspsi(t) is the number of past driving license suspension
spells. The link with traﬃc violation risk should be decreasing if such a spell
increases the perceived driving utility.
The revelation of unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account by an actuarial
predictor denoted as BM ji (m(t)), which is included as a constant in the hazard
function (an "oﬀset" variable). This predictor is updated each month, and m(t)
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is the month related to t. We retained a dynamic random eﬀects specification,
and the prediction takes into account the seniority of past traﬃc violations as
well as their number and the license holder risk exposure. The derivation of
bonus-malus coeﬃcients follows the linear credibility approach (see Section 5)
and is given in Appendix A.5 in a context of dynamic random eﬀects.
Eﬀort is expected to decrease with time only if the number of demerit points
accumulated is greater than zero. Hence we specified a stratified proportional
hazards model.20 The baseline hazard functions hSi(t)j depend on the risk type
j and on the stratum Si(t). There are two strata levels, depending on whether
the variable cdpi(t) is equal to zero or not.
Lastly, contract time ci(t) is integrated into the baseline hazard function hj.
The function ci is set equal to zero at the beginning of the whole period. Then
it is reset to zero at each event which triggers a variation of the accumulated
demerit points (i.e. traﬃc violation or redemption). This event-driven operation
should eliminate interactions between calendar and contract-time eﬀects for the
stratum associated to strictly positive values of accumulated demerit points.
In equation (10), the actuarial predictor is assumed to reflect the revelation of
unobserved heterogeneity in the first place, whereas the functions gj(cdp) and
hSj are first related to the event and time eﬀects of incentives. We do not, how-
ever, pretend to disentangle exactly the revelation of unobserved heterogeneity
and incentives eﬀects with this specification because the actuarial predictor is
calibrated on the observed dynamics, which include the incentive eﬀects. Let us
clarify two points.
• The actuarial predictor reflects the observed dynamics of the data, where
hazard rates increase with traﬃc violations and decrease with time. This
entails an opposite eﬀect in the estimation of the functions gj(cdp) and hj.
• Some particular specifications of the individual hazard functions can be
identified beyond the distribution mixing created by unobserved hetero-
geneity. For instance, this is the case if the hazard function varies geomet-
rically with the number of past events and does not depend on time, as
shown in Abbring et al (2003). We are not aware of a general solution ca-
pable of eliminating the event and time eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity.
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The actuarial predictor is derived from estimated covariances between dynamic
random eﬀects related to both traﬃc violation and accident equations (see Ap-
pendix A.5).
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 exhibits a decreasing shape with the lag for both covariances series. This
means that the predictive ability of past traﬃc violations on both risk types
decreases with the seniority. The two moments related to a zero lag can be
interpreted as the relative increase in traﬃc violation risk after an event (traﬃc
violation or accident, depending on the equation) if risk exposure is close to zero.
The intuition can be grasped from equation (9). For instance, the bonus-malus
coeﬃcient for traﬃc violation risk doubles after a traﬃc violation at least in
the beginning. The corresponding increase for accident risk is equal to 63% and
justifies the use of traﬃc violations in insurance rating from an actuarial equity
point of view.
Insert Table 3 about here
From the theoretical model of Section 4.3, we expect eﬀort to increase with the
number of demerit points accumulated, under moral hazard. This is globally
true from Table 3, as coeﬃcients linked to this variable decrease after seven
points for traﬃc violation risk. It is worth mentioning that the SAAQ warns
the policyholders when the accumulated demerit points reach a seven point
threshold. On the other hand, the drivers are not informed when oﬀenses are
redeemed.
The license suspension threshold increased in January 1990 from twelve to fifteen
points. We tested the eﬀect of this reform and did not obtain significant diﬀer-
ences in the results. For instance, eﬀort increases beyond seven points before
and after the 1990 reform.
The number of past driving license suspension spells brings interesting results
on the traﬃc violation equation. One suspension spell entails a 5.6% reduction
in traﬃc violation frequency, and two a 13.1% reduction. A possible explanation
is that the perceived driving utility of drivers increases after a driving licence
suspension spell.
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Insert Figure 3 about here
Let us comment on the baseline hazard functions given in Figure 3 on traﬃc
violation risk. Consider first the stratum with cdp > 0. Contract-time is less
than two years as it represents the time elapsed since the last variation of accu-
mulated demerit points. The hazard function is globally increasing. This result
which is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model (i.e. optimal ef-
fort decreases with the seniority of non redeemed traﬃc violations, if any). The
other baseline hazard function is not exactly stationary whereas it should be
since it is related to drivers with zero demerit points. This means that the eﬀect
on the hazard function of the actuarial coeﬃcient included as an oﬀset variable
is probably too strong. However the global variations of the hazard functions
in the two strata are very diﬀerent (62% vs. 12%), which reflects a significant
diﬀerence in the time eﬀects of incentives.
Let us test another prediction of the theoretical model, which is the continuity
of eﬀort before and after a redemption. If a traﬃc violation is followed by a two
year violation free record, the baseline hazard function jumps from 1.62 (the
terminal value of the baseline hazard function related to cdp > 0) to 1.60, which
corresponds to the initial value of the other hazard function. On the other hand,
the actuarial predictor is continuous before and after a redemption. Hence the
continuity property of eﬀort is almost fulfilled.
From Table 2, we know that the bonus-malus coeﬃcient for traﬃc violation
risk doubles after a traﬃc violation if risk exposure is low. This explains why
the baseline hazard function of the stratum defined by cdp = 0 is higher than
the other one. When a traﬃc violation is recorded, the only modification in the
related risk is due to the modification of the incentives. Hence the decrease in the
baseline hazard function compensates the increase in the actuarial coeﬃcient.
If the actuarial coeﬃcient is not included as an oﬀset variable in the proportional
hazards regression, the baseline functions for traﬃc violation risk decrease with
time, whatever the number of demerit points accumulated. This means that
the time eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity is higher than the time eﬀect of
incentives.
From Table 3, the number of demerit points accumulated has less influence on
accident risk than on traﬃc violation risk. A possible interpretation is that we
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cannot separate at fault from no-fault accidents. In the literature, the incentive
eﬀect is usually higher with at fault accidents. Besides, drivers close to license
suspension might also have an opportunistic behavior with respect to traﬃc
violations (e.g. paying more attention to radars) without modifying otherwise
their attitude towards road traﬃc risk.
As with traﬃc violations, past driving license suspension spells reduce accident
risk. The baseline hazard functions related to accidents are more stationary.
6.2 Incentive eﬀects of the experience rating scheme in
force since 1992 and overall comparisons
In Section 3, we mentioned a 12.5% decrease in the average frequency of traﬃc
violations before and after the reform which introduced the experience rating
structure based on demerit points. This result is scarcely modified if we control
with the regression components used in Table 3. A regression estimated on the
whole period (i.e. from 1985 to 1996) with the covariates of Section 6.1 and a
dummy related to the period following December 1, 1992 associates the reform
with a 15% decrease.21
Figure 2 suggests that the number of demerit points accumulated since the last
contract birthday should be able to discriminate the eﬀort level. For instance,
drivers with no traﬃc violation since this date are less incited by the reform
to drive safely than those with two demerit points accumulated. We did not,
however, obtain significant results with this variable (i.e. by crossing the dummy
linked to the 1992 reform and the number of demerit points accumulated since
the last contract birthday). The actual incentive eﬀect of the reform is similar
to a uniform increase in the average fine.22
Let us make an overall comparison of the three incentive schemes. Before the
1992 reform, fines were supplemented by a point-record driving license. Optimal
eﬀort after n non redeemed traﬃc violations depends on the argument of λ∗,
which is the dual of the hazard function λ (see equation (2)). This argument
is equal to fa + un − un+1 from equation (5). We recall that the average fine
fa is equal to $130. Besides, the 1992 reform entails an average increase in
the argument of λ∗ which is equal to $12 from Section 4.4.23 At this point, it
seems interesting to relate the optimal risk level and the argument of λ∗, which
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determines the optimal eﬀort level.
This relation can be assessed from the elasticity between optimal frequency risk
and the argument of λ∗. When the incentives are eﬀective, it can be shown that
this elasticity is greater than−1 if and only if log(λ) is a convex function of eﬀort
(elasticity and convexity are considered locally: see Appendix A.4 for a proof). A
global elasticity equal to −1 is linked to an exponential decay of λ. With λ(e) =
λ(0)×exp(−αe) indeed, the optimal risk level as a function of ∆u (the argument
of λ∗) is equal to 1/(α∆u) if the incentives are eﬀective. Lastly, incentives are
locally more eﬃcient if the elasticity is less than −1, which corresponds to a
locally concave shape for log(λ). From Table 3, a traﬃc violation worth two
or three points entails a reduction of traﬃc violation frequency of about twenty
percent beyond seven demerit points accumulated. A twenty percent reduction
in the frequency of traﬃc violations could be related to a twenty five percent
increase in the argument of λ∗ with an exponential eﬀort function.
Let us assess the global eﬃciency of the 1992 reform. A fifteen percent reduction
in traﬃc violation risk can be related to the variation in the argument of λ∗
induced by the reform if the incentives are eﬀective. As the reform entailed a
significant reduction in traﬃc violation risk for every number of demerit points
accumulated, we can assume that incentives are eﬀective for a representative
driver before the 1992 reform. From equation (5), a suﬃcient condition to have
this result is that the average fine is higher than the threshold beyond which the
incentives are eﬀective.
Eﬀective incentives lead us to analyse the elasticity between traﬃc violation
risk and the argument of λ∗. Suppose that we leave out the modifications of
lifetime utility variations due to the aggregation of incentive schemes. Then we
can relate:
• On one hand, a relative increase in the argument of λ∗ which lies between
9% and 10%. Indeed, the 1992 reform entails a $12 average increase in
the argument of λ∗. This increase supplements the other arguments of λ∗,
i.e. the $130 average fine and the utility variation for the point-record
driving license. In Table 3, the point-record driving license oﬀers signif-
icant incentives to careful driving beyond a seven point threshold, which
corresponds to a minority of drivers (1.4%). The contribution of the point-
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record driving license to the argument of λ∗ is low as compared with fines,
and the $12 increase corresponds to a relative increase in the argument
which lies between 9% and 10%.
• On the other hand, a 15% reduction in the frequency of traﬃc violations
after the 1992 reform.
This suggests that the elasticity between the optimal frequency risk and the
argument of λ∗ is less than -1 in this case. This result is linked to a locally
concave shape of log(λ) for the representative driver. However external eﬀects
could also explain the reduction in the frequency of traﬃc violations. We cannot
eliminate these eﬀects because there is no control group that is not aﬀected by
the reform. Obviously, the last developments were obtained at the expense of
several approximations, but the purpose was to provide a helicopter view of the
incentive schemes as a whole.
7 Conclusion
As a conclusion, let us compare the three incentive mechanisms used by the
SAAQ. Fines are the most eﬃcient device on average, but the absence of memory
entails a uniform incentive eﬀect for given characteristics of the policyholder. We
designed our incentive models with a representative driver, but there is of course
heterogeneity in the individual parameters, such as the threshold beyond which
the incentives are eﬀective. We did not have wealth variables at hand, and an
interesting empirical issue would have been to cross such variables with a reform
dummy in risk assessment.
The experience rated premium enforced in 1992 is a monetary point-record mech-
anism. Its incentive eﬀects do not strictly increase with the accumulated demerit
points because of the steps in the rating structure. The empirical results exhibit
a rather uniform eﬃciency of the reform, i.e. a 15% decrease in the frequency of
traﬃc violations. The incentive eﬀect of the reform looks more like that induced
by an increase in the average fine. The SAAQ is going to modify its rating
policy, with a premium increase from the first demerit point. This will enhance
its eﬃciency for the majority of drivers with a violation-free record.
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The incentive eﬀects of the point-record driving license increase with the number
of demerit points accumulated. This confirms the presence of moral hazard in
the data. The point-record driving license also acts as an incapacitating device
for reckless drivers. Another desirable property is the fact that the behavior
of risky drivers improves when they come close to or go beyond the license
suspension threshold, as was shown in Section 6.1.
Notes
1See WHO (2004). The fatality rates include pedestrians, motorcyclists and bicyclists
involved in road accidents. The discrepancy in fatality rates between OECD and emerging
countries cannot be explained by variations in risk exposure alone. For instance, motor vehicles
used in Vietnam are mostly motorcycles. The number of motorcycles grew by 29% during 2001.
At the same time road fatalities rose by 37%.
2As of 2004, this number was equal to 5 in Holland, 8.6 in Canada, 9.2 in France and 14.5
in the USA. On the other hand, 27 fatalities per 100,000 persons were reported in Vietnam.
3These clauses and their incentive properties are detailed in Section 4.
4Real-life experience rating schemes have a "crime and punishment" flavor which makes
it diﬃcult to use no-fault claims. Traﬃc violations also have a predictive ability for accident
risks (see Section 6). Besides, they are often accessible to American insurance companies
(Federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 1997), which is not the case in European countries
like France.
5Other references on empirical analyses of asymmetric information in insurance markets
include Cohen (2005), Dionne and St Michel (1991), Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), Puelz
and Snow (1994).
6Selecting at random one percent of the new licence holders every year would of course
have been a preferable sampling procedure. One thousand new licence holders would then
have been selected every year as the entry rate in the SAAQ portfolio is close to 2.5%.
7The attrition rate usually ranges between five and ten percent for mutual insurers, and is
closer to twenty percent for stock insurers. The aforementioned values are given for a single
product, i.e. motor insurance. The turnover rate can rise to fifty percent in situations where
the contract is not tacitly renewed, as in United Kingdom.
8Binary variables related to traﬃc oﬀenses and attrition were created on a monthly basis,
and explained with the covariates used in Section 6.1. The score test statistic is equal to 0.34.
Hence we do not reject the nullity of the correlation coeﬃcient at usual significance levels.
9We begin in 1985 in order to match the regressions which follow, as a two year history
is needed to derive the accumulated demerit points. Data are here averaged over one year,
which is necessary because of the strong seasonal eﬀects.
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10We thank a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
11Drivers with a contract birthday between the announcement of the reform and its en-
forcement are not incited by the experience rated premium before the birthday. Incentives
exist otherwise (for these drivers after the birthday, and for all the other drivers). A referee
suggested using this natural experiment in order to disentangle the incentive eﬀects of the
reform from calendar eﬀects. We did not obtain significant results. Four months are however
a short period, and only one driver out of twelve was not incited by the rating scheme on
average during the period.
12Important variables in the regressions like the accumulated demerit points have low fre-
quencies for the highest values. An accurate estimation is diﬃcult if the frequency of events
is low, as it is the case for accidents with bodily injuries.
13These redemptive mechanisms also exist in experience rating schemes. In the French
"bonus-malus" system, drivers with a bad accident record are rated as beginners after a two
year claimless history.
14All the traﬃc oﬀenses recorded in the data base are linked to convictions, which is the
condition for the addition of demerit points.
15This reinstatement can be seen as a redemption of demerit points. In the paper, we
consider a redemptive mechanism to be a suppression of demerit points applied before the
suspension of the driving license.
16Safe driving eﬀort can also reduce the expected disutility of accidents. If e → δ(e) is the
implied decrease in the disutility flow, replacing e by e − δ(e) includes the influence of safe
driving eﬀort on accident risk. This eﬀect should not be significant when insurance coverage
is compulsory and almost comprehensive as in Quebec for bodily injury. The accident risk is
low in compulsory insurance regimes such as the one in Quebec for bodily injury.
17This is another important diﬀerence between the SAAQ experience rating scheme and the
French "bonus-malus" system. The horizon of utility derivation is that of the next premium
payment, which is much shorter than a suitable horizon for the French "bonus-malus" scheme.
18This point could be questioned because incentive eﬀects are intrinsic, which is not the
case for unobserved heterogeneity (which is residual with respect to observable information).
The domination of the revelation eﬀect does however hold in practice. On the other hand,
incentives eﬀects can have the same duration-event eﬀects as unobserved heterogeneity. This
is the case for Type I redemptive systems, from the results given in Section 4.3.
19Comprehensive regressions based on two year periods can be found in Dionne, Maurice,
Pinquet, and Vanasse (2001).
20Stratification in a proportional hazards model means that Cox likelihoods (of a multino-
mial logit type) are derived for each stratum and then multiplied together. In other words, an
individual with an observed event is assumed to have competed only with other individuals
in the same stratum and at risk at the same date. However, the same coeﬃcients for the
covariates are used across all strata.
21We retained the covariates used in Table 3, except for dummies related to years and the
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number of past license suspension spells. The estimated additive parameter for the reform
dummy is equal to -0.163, and the related standard deviation is equal to 0.008. Hence the
reform eﬀect is conclusive with the usual tests significance levels.
22In Section 4.2 indeed, we mentioned that the optimal eﬀort increases with the average fine
for every number of demerit points accumulated if road safety incentives are a mix of fines
and of a point-record driving license.
23In Section 4.4, we derived expected disutilities vn(t) until the next contract birthday.
They can be associated with a negative lifetime utility un(t). We have
un(t) = −vn(t) + exp(−r(T − t))u0(0); u0(0) =
−v0(0)
1− exp(−rT ) .
From the preceding equation, we have un(t)−un+1(t) = vn+1(t)−vn(t). The average increase
in disutility after a traﬃc oﬀense is equal to the corresponding decrease in lifetime utility.
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TABLE 1:—SAAQ INSURANCE PREMIUMS FOR BODILY INJURY AS A FUNCTION 
OF ACCUMULATED DEMERIE POINTS SINCE THE LAST CONTRACT BIRTHDAY 
Accumulated demerit points 
(last two years) 
Premium for the next 
two years (Canadian $) 
Frequency 
(%) 
0,1,2,3 50 93.7 
4,5,6,7 100 4.9 
8,9,10,11 174 1.1 
12,13,14 286 0.2 
15 and more 398 0.1 
 
TABLE 2.—ESTIMATED MOMENTS OF RANDOM EFFECTS USED IN THE PREDICTION 
 ? ( )1 1, ,,i t i t hCov ε ε −  ? ( )2 1, ,,i t i t hCov ε ε −  
h = 0 0.981 0.636 
h = 1 0.800 0.482 
h = 2 0.745 0.368 
h = 3 0.731 0.336 
h = 4 0.704 0.344 
h = 5 0.705 0.293 
h = 6 0.648 0.289 
h = 7 0.673 0.288 
h = 8 0.636 0.342 
h = 9 0.608 0.296 
,
j
i tε : Multiplicative random effect for driver i, in period t, and risk of type j. Random effects are 
supposed stationary and i.i.d. between the individuals. The covariances reflect the predictive ability of 
a traffic violation on both frequency risk types. They are estimated from an unconstrained 
semiparametric approach. We used Poisson regressions on traffic violations and accidents. Data are 
observed from 1983 to 1992, and we retained the covariates denoted as x in equation (10). The 
decreasing shape of the covariances as functions of the lag means that the predictive abilities of the 
traffic violations decrease with their seniority. 
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATION OF THE HAZARD FUNCTION FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
AND ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RISKS 
Variable Level Frequency (%) Traffic violation risk Accident risk 
0 (*) 98.96 0 0 
1 0.94 -0.058 -0.064 
  (0.022) (0.046) 
2 0.09 -0.140 -0.519 
  (0.062) (0.168) 
nsps: 
Number of past 
driving license 
suspension spells 
3 and more 0.01 -0.091 -0.147 
   (0.156) (0.410) 
0 point 76.60 stratum stratum 
1 point (*) 0.39 0 0 
2 points 9.36 0.100 0.073 
  (0.060) (0.107) 
3 points 6.23 0.119 0.192 
  (0.061) (0.107) 
cdp: 
Number of demerit 
points 
accumulated 
(last two years) 
4 points 1.92 0.124 0.065 
   (0.062) (0.111) 
 5 points 2.09 0.155 0.121 
   (0.062) (0.110) 
 6 points 1.25 0.104 0.120 
   (0.063) (0.113) 
 7 points 0.72 0.102 0.005 
   (0.065) (0.118) 
 8 points 0.55 -0.032 0.101 
   (0.067) (0.120) 
 9 points 0.43 -0.133 0.152 
   (0.071) (0.125) 
 10 points 0.32 -0.184 0.084 
   (0.072) (0.127) 
 11 points 0.06 -0.051 -0.192 
   (0.104) (0.223) 
 12 points 0.04 -0.625 0.087 
   (0.147) (0.230) 
 13-14 points 0.04 -0.283 -0.347 
   (0.120) (0.265) 
(*): Reference level. Additive coefficients, level frequencies are weighted by duration. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Additional regression variables are: gender, driving license class (9 levels), place of residence (16 
levels), age of the driver (5 slopes) as well as calendar effects related to years (8 levels) and months (12 levels). 
 
Number of observations: 3,587,654 duration-events of at most one month, derived from 41,290 driving licenses. 
Global test for the nullity of coefficients (traffic violations): likelihood ratio statistic = 19416.71.; degrees of freedom 
= 62; limit significance level < 0.0001. 
Global test for the nullity of coefficients (accidents): likelihood ratio statistic = 4464.91; degrees of freedom = 62; 
limit significance level < 0.0001. 
Figure 1.-- Relative frequencies (in percentage) for traffic violations and accidents
(one year moving average)
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Figure 2.-- Expected variation of the optimal disutility after a traffic offense,
   as a function of the accumulated demerit points and time
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Figure 3. Baseline hazard functions for traffic violation risk, stratification by accumulated demerit 
points (cdp) in the last two years (strata cdp=0 and cdp>0)
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A Appendix
A.1 Incentive eﬀects of point-record driving licenses: Model
without redemption
Let us first give the main properties of the function
λ∗ : ∆u→ min
e≥0
e+ [λ(e)×∆u] = min
e≥0
h(∆u, e) ,
with λ a positive, decreasing and strictly convex hazard function. The related
optimal eﬀort level is equal to
eopt(∆u) = argmin
e≥0
h(∆u, e)⇒
eopt(∆u) = 0 if ∆u ≤
−1
λ
0
(0)
; eopt(∆u) =
³
λ
0
´−1µ−1
∆u
¶
if ∆u ≥ −1
λ
0
(0)
. (11)
Hence the dual function λ∗ is defined on the real line as the optimal eﬀort. From
the last equation, we obtain
∆u ≤ −1
λ
0
(0)
⇒ λ∗(∆u) = λ(0)×∆u, (12)
and the dual function is linear in the neighborhood of 0, which corresponds to
no eﬀort. The dual function λ∗ is strictly increasing since λ is strictly positive.
If ∆u ≥ 0, we have that:
λ∗(∆u) = h(∆u, eopt(∆u)) ≥ eopt(∆u)⇒ lim
∆u→+∞
λ∗(∆u) ≥ lim
∆u→+∞
eopt(∆u) = +∞.
Hence λ∗ is an increasing homeomorphism on the real line.
The dual of a convex function is concave. This can be proved with geometrical
arguments (see Rockafellar (1996)), or by the envelope theorem. We have
h
0
∆u(∆u, e) = λ(e)⇒ λ
0
∗(∆u) = h
0
∆u(∆u, eopt(∆u)) = λ(eopt(∆u)). (13)
Hence λ∗ is concave from the assumptions on λ and from the properties of eopt.
We give a proof of the increasing property of the optimal eﬀort level as a function
of accumulated demerit points. From equation (1), we obtain
un − un+1 = λ−1∗ (r(umax − un)), umax =
du
r
(0 ≤ n < N). (14)
1
The sequence (un)0≤n≤N is decreasing since we have umax ≥ un. Plugging this
result into the last equation implies that the sequence (un − un+1)0≤n<N is in-
creasing. The optimal eﬀort level is denoted as en, and expressed as
en = arg min
e≥0
e+ [λ(e)× (un − un+1)] = eopt(un − un+1),
for 0 ≤ n < N , where eopt is defined from (11). As eopt is an increasing function,
the optimal eﬀort is an increasing function of the number of demerit points for
any given value of the license suspension threshold.
Let us prove condition (4). From (14) and (12), we obtain
en > 0⇔ un − un+1 =
du − run
λ(0)
>
−1
λ
0
(0)
= ∆u. (15)
If fines are included in the incentives, un+1 is replaced by un+1− fa in equation
(1), which leads to the recurrence equation (see Figure 4)
du − run = λ∗(un − un+1 + fa)
⇔ un+1 = un + fa− λ−1∗ (du − run) = g(un). (16)
The fixed point of g is the lifetime driving utility if fines were the only incentive
scheme, i.e. eumax = du − λ∗(fa)r .
We of course assume that du > λ∗(fa), i.e. eumax > 0. If the two incentives are
mixed, we have un ≤ eumax and we deduce from (16) the properties of utilities
and of optimal eﬀort levels as functions of n that we obtained in the first place.
Besides, we have
en > 0 ,∀n, ⇔ fa+ un − un+1 > ∆u ,∀n.
This condition is fulfilled if
fa > ∆u = −1/λ0(0),
in which case the incentives are eﬀective at every level.
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Notice that in this setting the optimal eﬀort depends on the lifetime utility but
not on the fines. Indeed, optimal eﬀort depends on the argument of λ∗. From
equation (16), this argument is equal to:
un − un+1 + fa = λ−1∗ (du − run).
Let us prove that optimal eﬀort increases with the average fine for any given
value of n and N . Let us denote as ujn the lifetime utility linked to an average
fine fa
j
(j = 1, 2). The recurrence equation is
ujn+1 = gj(u
j
n), gj(u) = f(u) + fa
j
.
The function f refers to the recurrence equation on utilities with the point-
record driving license alone (see Figure 4). From equations (1) and (3), the ujn
are the solutions of the equations
g◦Nj (u
j
0)− βuj0 = 0; g◦N−nj (ujn)− βu
j
0 = 0. (17)
We denote gj ◦ . . . ◦
n times
gj as g◦nj . Suppose that fa
2
> fa
1
: as g2 > g1, we have
g◦N2 (u10) − βu10 > 0, which entails u20 < u10 since the function u → g◦N2 (u) − βu
is increasing (see Figure 4a). Indeed, we have β < 1 and g02 > 1. As u
j
N =
βuj0 (j = 1, 2), the inequality also holds for the terminal values of the utilities.
As g2 > g1 and g◦N−n2 is increasing, equation (17) implies that the solution
u∗ of the equation g◦N−n2 (u∗) − βu10 = 0 is lower than u1n. As u20 < u10, we
obtain u2n < u∗ from the increasing property of g
◦N−n
2 . Hence, we have that
u2n < u1n, and the lifetime utility as well as the optimal eﬀort level decrease
with the average fine for any given value of n and N . This proof is summarized
graphically in Figure 4b.
A.2 Incentive eﬀects of point-record driving licenses: Mod-
els with redemption
We derive below the incentive properties of the Type I redeeming systems pre-
sented in Section 4.3.
The expected utility is denoted as un(t), where t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is the seniority
of the last convicted traﬃc violation. The expected utility for n = 0 does not
3
depend on time, and is denoted as u0. All the demerit points are redeemed if
t = T, and we have un(T ) = u0 for n = 1, . . . , N −1. With the assumptions and
notations of Section 4.2, the Bellman equation is
u
0
n(t) = (run(t)− du) + λ∗(un(t)− un+1(0)) (0 ≤ n < N)
⇔ u0n = fun+1(0)(un), fv(u) = (ru− du) + λ∗(u− v). (18)
Hence un(t) is defined implicitly by the equationZ un(T )=u0
un(t)
du
fun+1(0)(u)
= T − t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (19)
The functions fv are strictly increasing and the integral of 1/fv diverges in the
neighborhood of the value which nullifies fv because we have
r < f
0
v(u) ≤ r + λ(0) ∀u, v.
Hence un+1(0) is defined from un(0) from equation (19) with t = 0, which implies
that
fun+1(0)(un(0)) > 0.
This condition holds if fv(un(0)) > 0 for positive values of v, which amounts to
un(0) > u, with f0(u) = (ru− du) + λ∗(u) = 0.
Then
fun+1(0)(u) > 0 ∀u ∈ [un(0), un(T ) = u0]
and un is strictly increasing on [0, T ] from (18).
A result with an obvious economic interpretation is that the sequence (un(0))n=0,...,N
is decreasing. Indeed, we have
fun+1(0)(un(0)) > 0⇔ un(0)− un+1(0) > λ−1∗ (du − run(0)) > 0. (20)
Let us prove now the concavity of the sequence (un(0))n=0,...,N , which means that
the sequence (un(0)− un+1(0))n=0,...,N is increasing. The recurrence equation
un+1(0) = w(un(0)), with
Z u0
v
du
(ru− du) + λ∗(u− w(v))
= T (21)
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follows from (19) with t = 0. Consider v0, v1 with u < v0 < v1 < du/r.
We haveZ u0
v1
du
(ru− du) + λ∗(u− w(v1))
= T ;
Z u0
v0
du
(ru− du) + λ∗(u− w(v1) + v1 − v0)
> T.
The first equality results from (21). The second integrand is greater than the
first one if the comparison starts from the lower bound of the integral, and the
wider range of the second integration reinforces the inequality. As these integrals
increase with w, we have that
v0 < v1 ⇒ w(v1) + v0 − v1 > w(v0).
Hence the function v → v − w(v) is decreasing. We obtain the desired result
with v0 = un+1(0) and v1 = un(0).
We can then prove the results given in Section 4.3 on the optimal eﬀort level,
which we denote as en(t). We have
en(t) = eopt(un(t)− un+1(0)), (22)
where eopt is the increasing function defined in equation (11). Since the functions
un are strictly increasing on [0, T ], equation (22) implies the optimal eﬀort level
increases with time for a given number of demerit points. From the definition
of eopt, the optimal eﬀort is strictly increasing if it is greater than zero.
If the duration between demerit points n and n+ 1 is equal to t, the transition
between the optimal eﬀort levels is
en(t) = eopt(un(t)− un+1(0))→ en+1(0) = eopt(un+1(0)− un+2(0)).
If the last traﬃc violation immediately follows another one, the variation is
positive because of the concavity of the sequence (un(0))n=0,...,N . Since un is
increasing, the variation of optimal eﬀort after a convicted traﬃc violation de-
creases with the duration between the two last oﬀenses.
The following picture gives an example where
un(t)− un+1(0) > un+1(0)− un+2(0),
which implies a drop of the eﬀort level and an increase in risk if the driver is
convicted with a supplementary demerit point. This result is in contrast with
5
what is expected with a Type II redeeming mechanism.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Lastly, the optimal eﬀort after a redemption of all the demerit points is equal
to e0 = eopt(u0− u1(0)). This value is lower or equal to any optimal eﬀort level.
Indeed, we have
u0 − u1(0) ≤ un(0)− un+1(0) ≤ un(t)− un+1(0)
from the properties proved on the utility functions.
Let us now consider a redeeming system of Type II. The state variables are
the seniorities of each non redeemed traﬃc oﬀense, if any. Let us denote these
variables as
S = (t1, . . . , tn), 0 ≤ t1 < . . . < tn < T.
The corresponding lifetime utility and optimal eﬀort are denoted as u(S) and
e(S). Then the states reached without traﬃc oﬀense before the next redemption
are
St = (t1 + t, . . . , tn + t), 0 ≤ t < T − tn.
We denote the state reached from S after an additional traﬃc oﬀense (if n < N)
as
(0, t1, . . . , tn) = TR(S).
The Bellman equation on lifetime utility can be written as follows
du − ru(S) +
µ
d
dt
[u(St)]
¶
t=0+
= λ∗(u(S)− u(TR(S))).
Hence we have that
e(S) = eopt(u(S)− u(TR(S))).
Results similar to those derived for the Type I redeeming system do not seem
simple to obtain from the Bellman equation. For instance the monotonicity of
the map t → e(St) seems questionable. The result which follows suggests that
this map should globally be decreasing.
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Let us prove the continuity of optimal eﬀort after a redemption in a Type II
system. Since the lifetime utility is continuous after a redemption, we have the
following result:
n ≥ 1 : lim
t→(T−tn)−
u(St) = u(SR), SR = (t1 + T − tn, . . . , tn−1 + T − tn).
The state SR is reached from S if there is no traﬃc oﬀense before the first
redemption. Then it is easily seen that
lim
t→(T−tn)−
u [TR(St)] = u
£
TR(SR)
¤
= u(0, t1 + T − tn, . . . , tn−1 + T − tn).
This means that the left continuity at T − tn of the map t → u(St) also holds
for the map t→ u [TR(St)] , which is associated with the states reached after an
additional traﬃc oﬀense. The reason is that redemption of past oﬀenses occurs
regardless of the future individual history.
From the three last equations, we obtain
lim
t→(T−tn)−
e(St) = e(SR)
and the continuity property of the optimal eﬀort level. Since we expect a global
increasing link between optimal eﬀort and the accumulated demerit points, the
time-eﬀect should globally be decreasing in order to fulfill this continuity prop-
erty.
A.3 Incentive eﬀects of the experience rating system
Let us first prove the Bellman equation on the expected disutility function given
in (7), including an average fine of faj for a j demerit point traﬃc violation.
The optimal disutility function is obtained from the program
vn(t) = min
e≥0
edt+ (exp(−rdt)× (1− λ(e)dt)× vn(t+ dt))
+
⎛
⎝exp(−rdt)×
⎡
⎣ X
j / fj>0
fj λ(e)dt×
£
vmin(n+j,N)(t+ dt) + faj
¤⎤⎦⎞⎠+ o(dt),
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which leads to
0 = v
0
n(t) + λ∗
⎛
⎝fa+
⎛
⎝ X
j / fj>0
fj vmin(n+j,N)(t)
⎞
⎠− vn(t)
⎞
⎠− rvn(t),
with fa =
P
j / fj>0 fj × faj the average fine. Then we obtain (7) with the
average fine included in the argument of the dual function.
A.4 Holistic incentive models and overall comparisons
A.4.1 Holistic incentive model
The Bellman equation on a holistic incentive model can be written as follows
du − ru(S) +
µ
d
dt
[u(St)]
¶
t=0+
= λ∗(fa+ u(S)−E [u(TR(S))]). (23)
The state variables S are the seniorities of each non redeemed traﬃc oﬀense (if
any), the related demerit points and the seniority of the last contract birthday.
The related lifetime utility is u(S). The state St is reached from S with an
eventless history (no traﬃc oﬀense, redemption or contract birthday) of duration
t. The parameters du and fa are the driving utility flow and the average fine,
and E [u(TR(S))] is the lifetime utility averaged with transition probabilities
on the state(s) reached from S after a traﬃc oﬀense. Continuity equations on
utility before and after a redemption or at a contract birthday (in the latter case,
the increase in lifetime utility is equal to the disutility of the premium) and the
equation linking the utility of a beginner and just after a license suspension
define the solution together with equation (23).
A.4.2 Elasticity between optimal frequency risk and the argument
of λ∗ when the incentives are eﬀective
As a conclusion, let us derive the link given in Section 6.2 between the elasticity
of the optimal frequency of traﬃc violations and the argument of λ∗, which
determines the optimal eﬀort level. We perform a local expansion around a
value ∆u0 of the argument of λ∗, in a situation where the incentives are eﬀective
(i.e. ∆u0 > ∆u = −1/λ0(0)). If we write
e0 = eopt(∆u0), e0 + de = eopt(∆u0 + d∆u),
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the equations
1 + λ
0
(e0)∆u0 = 0; 1 +
h
λ
0
(e0 + de)
¡
∆u0 + d∆u
¢i
= 0
lead to
de =
−λ0(e0)
λ
00
(e0)∆u0
d∆u+ o (d∆u) ,
and to
dλ
λ(e0)
=
λ
0
(e0)
λ(e0)
de =
h
−λ0(e0)
i2
λ(e0)× λ00(e0) ×
d∆u
∆u0
.
Hence the aforementioned elasticity is equal to
³
λ
0
´2
/λλ
00
. Now we have that
(log λ)
00
=
λ
00
λ
−
Ã
λ
0
λ
!2
=
λ
00
λ
⎛
⎜⎝1 +
³
λ
0
´2
λλ
00
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Then the conclusions given in Section 4.2 are easily obtained.
A.5 Actuarial predictors with dynamic random eﬀects
Actuarial predictors are used as oﬀset variables in the duration models estimated
in Section 6.1. The predictors which follow generalize the basic formula given in
(9) for constant random eﬀects. The seniority of past traﬃc violations supple-
ments their number and risk exposure, already included in the basic predictor.
The bonus-malus coeﬃcient BM ji (m) given in (10) is obtained from an aﬃne
probabilistic regression of a multiplicative random eﬀect εji,m related to driver
i, month m and type j event with respect to the number of traﬃc violations
recorded for the driver for each past month, and denoted as N1i,m1 (m1 < m).
With the assumption E(εji,m) = 1, the predictor is given by
BM ji (m) = 1 +
tdCov(SN1i,m, εji,m) hbV (SN1i,m)i−1 (sn1i,m − bE ¡SN1i,m¢),
where SN1i,m = vecm1<m
(N1i,m1) is the stacked vector of numbers of past traﬃc
violations. The moments in the last expression are estimated from moments of
the random eﬀects derived from Table 2 (see Pinquet, Guillén, Bolancé (2001)
for details).
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Figure 4
Recurrence equation on the lifetime utility function
Point-record driving license without fines: u0n+1 = f(u
0
n)
Point-record driving license with fines: un+1 = g(un)
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.
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Figure 4a
Graphical proof for u20 < u10.
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Figure 4b
Graphical proof for u2n < u1n (N > n > 0).
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Figure 5: Utility functions and variation of the optimal eﬀort level
Optimal eﬀort decreases after a traﬃc violation in the state (n, t) if and only if
un(t)− un+1(0) > un+1(0)− un+2(0)⇐⇒ t > t0.
- time
6
utility
q
q
q
q
q
qqq
q
u0
un+2(0)
un+1(0)
un(0)
t0
un(t)
Tt0
13
